Hi! I am currently a PhD candidate in Comparative Politics at Princeton University, a 2024-2025 Prize Fellow in the Social Sciences and a Digital Humanitites Graduate Fellow. I study state-society interactions, state-building, and backlash against environmental policy with a focus on France.
My job market paper highlights the role of control over centralized communication infrastructure on the success of a regime takeover. The article uses a natural experiment based on Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte's coup in 1851 France and shows that the conspirators' control over information flows during the coup enabled the swift transition to autocracy by deterring the coordination of the opposition.
In addition, my book project, Voices in the Wilderness, explores local mobilization against wildlife policy and examines how exposure to environmental policies affect perceptions of the state in rural France.
Prior to Princeton, I received a BA and a Master’s degree in Economics and Public Policy (Summa Cum Laude) from Sciences Po Paris. I am advised by Carles Boix, Rafaela Dancygier, Andreas Wiedemann and Saad Gulzar. I am affiliated with the Research Group in Political Economy and the Initiatives on Contemporary European Affairs program.
- The Revolution Will Not Be Telegraphed
[Abstract]
[Lastest version]
How to successfully execute a coup? In this paper, I highlight the strategic importance of control over means of communications to deter the coordination of anti-coup challengers during the period of uncertainty that follows the beginning of a takeover attempt. Based on Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup in December 1851 that caused the breakdown of the Second Republic (1848-1851), I examine the effect of quasi-random interruptions in telegraphic communications between coup-plotters in Paris and bureaucrats (prefects) in the rest of France on the local size of anti-coup insurgency. I collected and digitized the full record of all time-stamped telegraphic dispatches exchanged during the coup (+4000 dispatches). This rich dataset allows an hour-by-hour examination of the effects of uncertainty on mobilization. I demonstrate that when the conspirators controlled information flows, they could prevent the rise of pro-democracy dissent and clear the path towards autocracy. By contrast, when communications with Paris were interrupted, local bureaucrats remained uncertain and stayed passive while mass unrest grew jeopardizing the success of the coup. The study examines the determinants of the largest provincial uprising in 19th century France and shows that, at this particular historical juncture of mass politicization and state modernization, centralized communication technology enabled the state to crush society, establishing Paris as the center of politics.
- Noblesse d'Etat - From Aristocracy to Bureaucracy: State Formation and The Selection of State Elites
[Abstract]
[Draft available on request]
How do regimes select local state elites to maintain and consolidate power? Rulers allocate state titles to secure elite loyalty, neutralize threats, and enhance administrative efficiency. However, they must balance two competing strategies: purging (ensuring loyalty) and cooptation (coup-proofing). First, this study examines the distribution of nobility titles and state offices over 1,000 years of French history, demonstrating how French monarchs strategically allocated aristocratic titles to counter both external challenges—such as integrating and controlling peripheral regions—and internal shifts in elite composition, particularly the rise of the bourgeoisie. Then, focusing on the 19th century, I analyze how the seven successive regimes that ruled France during this period used state elite selection to consolidate their rule. During periods of regime change, rulers face a critical choice: they can either exclude opposition and rely on a narrow faction of loyalists (purge strategy) or broaden their coalition by appointing opportunists from rival factions (cooptation strategy). The purge strategy strengthens regime survival by rewarding loyalty but risks inefficiency. In contrast, the cooptation strategy discourages opposition by offering career incentives, making rebellion more costly. However, this approach only succeeds when potential challengers perceive long-term stability within the regime. By analyzing these trade-offs, this study highlights how state-elite selection shapes both short-term political survival and long-term state formation, and highlights the strategic considerations which underscore the nonlinear historical transition from aristocracy to bureaucracy.
- When Modernization Backfires: understanding the determinants of the unlikely alliance of local landed elites and the rural poor
against the central state in XIXth century France
[Abstract]
In this paper, I show that the type of resistance to state intervention depends on
the economic interests of local elites. I examine the case of the plantation of the Forest of the Landes de
Gascogne decided in 1857 by the French government to enhance land productivity in a large swamp in the
south-west of France where property rights were never clearly delineated after the French Revolution. The
policy provoked a sudden change in the type of terrain and a radical shift in the nature of property regimes.
The paper shows that that where local elites appropriated the commons, the rural poor and landowners
entered a bargain to mitigate the economic consequences of privatization and coordinated against state
intervention through latent noncompliance. Where land was bought by outsider capitalists, elites did not
act as mediators and sought state repression to enforce their property rights. There, lower classes actively
resisted the policy through arson attacks against the plantations, illegally freeing grazing land. I collected
data on the structure of land ownership and the prevalence of forest fires at the municipal level for the
second half of the nineteenth century at departmental archives in France.
- Book project: Voices in the wilderness? The spatial distribution of the costs of environmental policy and anti-state mobilization
[Abstract]
[Draft available on request]
How does the geographic divide between the winners and losers of environmental policies affect backlash? Using a natural experiment based on wildlife policies protecting large carnivores in France since the mid-1990s, this study explores how the geographic scope of programs targeting wolves and bears influences political mobilization. At the micro-level, the analysis suggests that exposure to both policies leads to higher voter turnout in local elections at the municipal level, though no single party appears to benefit from this increase in participation. At the macro-level, the findings show that the geographic spread of each species led to different forms of resistance. Due to biological habitat-preferences, bears remain within a fixed mountainous area, while wolves colonize new territories. I show that the anti-bear movement has become much stronger and sustained than the anti-wolf movement. In contrast, at the national level, members of parliament have generally supported new bear releases while opposing wolf protection efforts. Since direct and indirect costs of both policies were generously compensated, the study highlights that symbolic costs—such as perceptions of relative deprivation—play a crucial role in explaining the backlash to environmental policies with localized impact.
