Hi! I am currently a PhD candidate in Comparative Politics at Princeton University and 2024-2025 Prize Fellow in the Social Sciences. I study contentious politics, state-building, and backlash against environmental policy with a focus on France.
My job market paper examines how an incumbent can effectively overthrow a democratic regime to stay in power and highlights the role of information in democratic breakdowns. The article uses a natural experiment based on Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte's coup in 1851 France and shows that control over information flows during a coup enabled the swift transition to autocracy by deterring the coordination of the opposition.
In addition, my book project, Voices in the Wilderness, explores local mobilization against wildlife policy and examines how exposure to environmental policies affect political behavior.
Prior to Princeton, I received a BA and a Master’s degree in Economics and Public Policy (Summa Cum Laude) from Sciences Po Paris. I am advised by Carles Boix, Rafaela Dancygier, Andreas Wiedemann and Saad Gulzar. I am affiliated with the Research Group in Political Economy and the Initiatives on Contemporary European Affairs program.
- The Revolution Will Not Be Telegraphed
[Abstract]
[Lastest version]
How to successfully execute a coup? The literature has mostly focused on identifying the conditions under which coups happen and achieve durable regime change. In this paper, I show that the actions of conspirators during a coup matter and highlight the strategic importance of control over means of communications to deter the coordination of anti-coup challengers. Based on Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup in December 1851 that caused the breakdown of the Second Republic (1848-1851), I examine the effect of quasi-random interruptions in telegraphic communications between coup-plotters in Paris and bureaucrats (prefects) in the rest of France on the local size of anti-coup insurgency. I collected and digitized the full record of all time-stamped telegraphic dispatches exchanged during the coup (+4000 dispatches). This rich dataset allows an hour-by-hour examination of the effects of uncertainty on mobilization. I demonstrate that when the conspirators controlled information flows, they could prevent the rise of pro-democracy dissent and clear the path towards autocracy. By contrast, when communications with Paris were interrupted, local bureaucrats remained uncertain and stayed passive while mass unrest grew jeopardizing the success of the coup. At a broader level, the study highlights that control over communication infrastructure is a key instrument of state power.
- Voices in the wilderness? The spatial distribution of the costs of environmental policy and anti-state mobilization
[Abstract]
[Draft available by request]
How does the geographic divide between the winners and losers of environmental policies affect backlash? Using a natural experiment based on wildlife policies protecting large carnivores in France since the mid-1990s, this study explores how the geographic scope of programs targeting wolves and bears influences political mobilization. At the micro-level, the analysis suggests that exposure to both policies leads to higher voter turnout in local elections at the municipal level, though no single party appears to benefit from this increase in participation. At the macro-level, the findings show that the geographic spread of each species led to different forms of resistance. Due to biological habitat-preferences, bears remain within a fixed mountainous area, while wolves colonize new territories. I show that the anti-bear movement has become much stronger and sustained than the anti-wolf movement. In contrast, at the national level, members of parliament have generally supported new bear releases while opposing wolf protection efforts. Since direct and indirect costs of both policies were generously compensated, the study highlights that symbolic costs—such as perceptions of relative deprivation—play a crucial role in explaining the backlash to environmental policies with localized impact.
- When Modernization Backfires: understanding the determinants of the unlikely alliance of local landed elites and the rural poor
against the central state in XIXth century France
[Abstract]
In this paper, I show that the type of resistance to state intervention depends on
the economic interests of local elites. I examine the case of the plantation of the Forest of the Landes de
Gascogne decided in 1857 by the French government to enhance land productivity in a large swamp in the
south-west of France where property rights were never clearly delineated after the French Revolution. The
policy provoked a sudden change in the type of terrain and a radical shift in the nature of property regimes.
The paper shows that that where local elites appropriated the commons, the rural poor and landowners
entered a bargain to mitigate the economic consequences of privatization and coordinated against state
intervention through latent noncompliance. Where land was bought by outsider capitalists, elites did not
act as mediators and sought state repression to enforce their property rights. There, lower classes actively
resisted the policy through arson attacks against the plantations, illegally freeing grazing land. I collected
data on the structure of land ownership and the prevalence of forest fires at the municipal level for the
second half of the nineteenth century at departmental archives in France.
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